can be drawn independently of whoever does the work or applies the work results" (p.1).
I think of this as bureaucratic research, because it seeks to factor out the human dimension-imagination, insight, discovery. If I study a phenomenon and come up with an interesting theory, is that not rigorous because someone else would not have come up with the same theory? Accept that and you must reject pretty much all theory, from physics to philosophy, because all were idiosyncratic efforts, the inventions of creative minds. ("I'm sorry, Mr. Einstein, but your theory of relativity is speculative, not proven, so we cannot publish it.") Sumantra Ghoshal wrote to the same editor about an article that he had earlier reviewed:
I have seen the article three times… The reviewing process, over these iterations, has changed the flavor of the article significantly. I believe that the new argument… is interesting but unavoidably superficial… Citations and literature linkages have driven out most of the richness and almost all of the speculation that I liked so much in the first draft. While the article perhaps looks more "scholarly," I am not sure who exactly gains from this look… I cannot get over the regret of description, insight and speculation losing out to citation, definition and tightness. (reprinted in Mintzberg, 2004: 399) But it does so much of the time, because we confuse rigor with relevance, and deduction with induction. Indeed the proposal I received for this very book did that:
"…the process of theory building and testing is objective and enjoys a self-correcting characteristic that is unique to science. Thus the checks and balances involved in the http://www.mintzberg.org development and testing of theory are so conceived and used that they control and verify knowledge development in an objective manner independent of the scientist." They sure do: that is why we see so little induction in our field, the creation of so little interesting theory.
Karl Popper, whose name a secretary of mine once mistyped as "Propper," wrote a whole book about The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) . In the first four pages (27) (28) (29) (30) , in a section entitled "The Problem of Induction," he dismissed this process, or more exactly what he called, oxymoronically, "inductive logic." Yet with regard to theory development itself, he came out much as I did above.
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logic analysis not to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man-whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory-may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is concerned not with questions of fact What discovery is there in deduction? Maybe something about the how, why, when, and 1973; for a better example, see my paper with Alexandra McHugh, "Strategy Formation in an Adhocracy" [1985] , which has often been referred to as qualitative even though it is based on a study of 3000 films tabulated every which way).
This mix-up leaves the impression that "quantative" research is somehow proper (or Propper)-i.e., "scientific"-even if it contributes no insight, while qualitative research is something to be tolerated at best, and then only when exemplary. This is the double standard that pervades our academic journals to their terrible discredit. When I think about it, however, I see explanation along a continuum, from lists (categories), to typologies (comprehensive lists), to impressions of relationships among factors (not necessarily "variables": that sounds too reified for many of the factors I work with), to causations between and patterns among these relationships, to fully explanatory models (which interweave all the factors in question).
I think of myself as an obsessive categorizer-I love neat typologies-but I have done my share of trying to develop relationships and models too.
As noted earlier, I am supposed to be using here my research on managerial work, presumably as I first developed it for 1973). There I described various characteristics of managerial work and a framework of the roles managers seem to perform, as well as discussing variations in managerial work. Much of that was more about lists and typologies, with lots of impressions as well as numbers, than a full-blown model. (Put more exactly, perhaps, the models in that book were its weakest part.) Only much later ("Rounding Out the Manager's Job," 1994), did I come up with more of a model, by using the categories of my earlier work as well as those of other studies.
(Diagrams from these two works follow later.)
The theory development of which I am more proud-I see it as my most parsimonious work-is in my book The Structuring of Organization (1979) . I described first how organizations function, in terms of five basic parts and five essential mechanisms of coordination. After describing the basic parameters of designing organization (positions, superstructure, linkages, etc.) , and contingency factors influencing that designing (age and size of the organization, complexity and dynamism of its environment, etc.), I wove all this together around a typology of five models: forms, or "configurations" (i.e., patterns) of organizing, each a theory unto itself, with detailed explanations and causations. Later (1989, Section II) did I weave these different models into a model in its own right, using what I called forces alongside forms, to discuss http://www.mintzberg.org configuration, combination, conversion, contradiction, and competencies, ending with a life cycle model of organizations.
What Theory Development Seems to Be: unexpected
We get interesting theory when we let go of all this scientific correctness, or to use a famous phrase, suspend our disbeliefs, and allow our minds to roam freely and creatively-to muse like mad, albeit immersed in an interesting, revealing context. Hans Selye, the great physiologist, captured this sentiment perfectly in quoting one item on a list of "Intellectual Immortalities" put out by a well-known physiology department:
"Generalizing beyond one's data." Selye quoted approvingly a commentator who asked whether it would have been more correct for this to read: "Not generalizing beyond one's data" (1964:228) . No generalizing beyond the data, no theory. And no theory, no insight. And if no insight, why do research?
Theory is insightful when it surprises, when it allows us to see profoundly, imaginatively, unconventionally into phenomena we thought we understood. To quote Will Henry, "What is research but a blind date with knowledge." No matter how accepted eventually, theory is of no use unless it initially surprises-that is, changes perceptions.
(A professor of mine once said that theories go through three stages: first they're wrong; then they're subversive; finally they're obvious.) All of this is to say that there is a great deal of art and craft in true science. In fact, an obsession with the science, narrowly considered, gets in the way of scientific development. To quote Berger, "In science, as in love, a concentration on technique is likely to lead to impotence " (1963:13 I think of this approach as pull, not push, and I believe it key to theory development. Let yourself be pulled by an important concern out there, not pushed by some elegant construct in here. Take your lead from behavior in practice. And ask the big questions. In my experience, the problem in doctoral theses, and subsequent research people do, is not that they bite off more than they can chew, but that they nibble less than they should consume. Or to use another metaphor, I admire researchers who try to build cathedrals, not lay a few bricks. As Fritjds Capra put it in Turning Point, "If I ask a particle question, [the electron] will give me a particle answer" (1982:77) .
Second, I need to be stimulated by rich description. There are novelists who sit down with a blank pad and write-management theorists too, I suppose. I can't do http://www.mintzberg.org that. I need to be stimulated by some body of rich inputs that I see right before me.
Tangible data is best-the "thick" description that Clifford Geertz has described---not data all nicely ordered and systematically presented. (Robert Darnton has described Geertz's work as "open-ended, rather than bottom-lined.") And stories are best of all, because while hard data may suggest some relationship, it is this kind of rich description that best helps to explain it. So anecdotal data is not incidental to theory development at all, but an essential part of it.
But this needn't be data per se. My favorite among my own books, The Structuring of Organizations, was written out of the theories, research findings, and descriptions of others-in other words, it was based mostly on existing literature. But even here, it was the thickest descriptive literature, closest to the data, most notably in Joan Woodward's work (to which I shall return), that helped me most in the development of the theory. Highly structured descriptions, for example based on data collection around a couple of abstract variables, was far less useful. Think of the wouldbe theorist trying to swim in water as compared with a tank of shredded paper.
Third, and perhaps trickiest of all, I need to bootstrap an outline. That is, I
must have an outline to write down my ideas, even if the object of writing down my ideas is to come up with an outline. This is the ultimate problem in creating theory (and, I suspect, doing interesting writing in general).
No matter how we think about our theories, ultimately we have to convey them to other people in linear order, and that means mostly in words. Mozart claimed about creating a symphony that the "best of all is the hearing it all at once." (He also wrote http://www.mintzberg.org Organizations came out faster-at least once I had that outline-and far more coherently, or perhaps I should say orderly, than any other book I have written. It literally integrates from the opening dedication to the final sentence. On the other hand, messy can sometimes be better, because it can be richer. To quote Voltaire, "Doubt is not a pleasant state, but certainty is a ridiculous one" (in Seldes, 1983:713 (Mintzberg 1973 Appendix C, 1979b , 1991 , 1993 , 2002 , 2004 : 250-252, and 1984 . But I haven't Sixth [going back to the original outline, which is why this may seem a little disconnected], to develop good theory you have to connect and disconnect. In other words, you have to get as close to the phenomena as possible in digging out the inputs (data, stories, and lots more), but then be able to step back to make something interesting out of them.
Too connected and you risk getting coopted by the phenomenon-that, to my mind, is why so called "action research" has, with a few notable exceptions, not produced much interesting theory. The researcher cannot have his or her cake (of consulting income) and eat it too (with research publications-practical publications maybe, good research ones rarely). Researchers have to be able to step back.
But too disconnected and you cannot develop interesting theory either. As suggested earlier, the imagination is stimulated by rich description, nuanced exposure: stories and anecdotes are better than measures on seven point scales and the like. If http://www.mintzberg.org you are going to measure, then measure as much as possible in real terms-close to how things actually happen in the world, for example the time managers actually spend on email instead of the time managers claim they spend on email (unless of course you are studying perceptions). This is what I believe to be the problem hounding economics today. This is one social science where researchers have nowhere to go to observe firsthand the behaviors they seek to describe. So they pile abstraction upon abstraction.
(Sure there are fish markets. But ironically, what economists take to be markets today are fundamentally removed from the markets we can all go and see. These are places of community, where economic, social, and cultural factors all converge. The arm's length markets of today's economics overemphasize the economic at the expense of the social and cultural: they are antithetical to communities.) Do we encourage our researchers to connect every which way? Hardly. In the case of doctoral students, we lock them in libraries for years and then tell them to go find a research topic. The library is the worst place in the world in which to find a research topic. Even students who were once in the world of real things have forgotten what goes on there.
The result is that a great deal of research is pushed by some theoretical construct or angle: game theory, networking concepts, beliefs about corporate social responsibility (yet again), whatever is fashionable in the world of academe. Under the scrutiny of such single lenses, organizations look distorted. Recall the "rule of the tool"-you give a little boy a hammer and everything looks like a nail. Narrow concepts are no better than narrow techniques. Organizations doesn't need to be hit over the head with either. You are not going to make the great breakthrough from the note that fits. As you order the notes, it is of course quite nice when things fall into place. You proceed happily; parsimony is in your grasp, maybe tenure too. Also, perhaps, banality. And then comes this nasty note: some observation, idea, or example that simply refuses to fit.
Weak theorists, I believe, throw such notes away. They don't wish to deal with the ambiguity. They want it all to be neat. Back to Hans Selye for another wonderful quote, in remarks to the Canadian Senate on Science Policy: "I doubt that Fleming could have obtained a grant for the discovery of penicillin on that basis because he could not have said, 'I propose to have an accident in a culture so that it will be spoiled by a mould falling on it, and I propose to recognize the possibility of extracting an antibiotic from this mould.'" I get a great kick out of the fact that many of my doctoral students defend their thesis proposals well into their empirical work. After all, how can they know what they will do until they do it? I'm waiting for someone to defend the proposal in the morning and the dissertation in the afternoon! Was Fleming a genius because of his insight? I'll bet many of those 31 other researchers were considered geniuses (then if not now). We have altogether too many geniuses in research and not enough ordinary, open minds.
I believe that there are not creative people in this world so much as blocked people. After all, every one of us has wild and wooly dreams. Only after we wake up do most of us stop being creative. (That is why the best of creativity so often happens at the interface, just as we wake up, when our more visually-inclined right hemisphere, where dreaming activity occurs, connects with our more analytically-inclined left, where speech takes place. That is when we are best able to connect those Mozart-like images with the linear order of words. To repeat, to be creative is not just to have the idea but also to express it.)
As the day unfolds, we hit the world as it is-fighting traffic to work, meeting an agitated boss, getting Propperian reviews of our latest journal submission-and that's the end of creativity. We get careful, or scared, either way blocked: we become correct.
So much for those dreams. Not because he said that the emperor was wearing no clothes: that was the easy part.
Because he saw it. Amidst all those people who wouldn't let themselves see it, because they were afraid, he was open.
Fear is antithetical to theory development-fear of being different, fear of standing out, fear of not belonging, fear of being wrong, or subversive (if not obvious).
Yet we have built fear into the whole process by which we do and assess research, especially in the tenure process. Open the journals and read the results. In other words, I prefer a bit of quirkiness in my doctoral students, which reflects no fear of being different. (Not too quirky, mind you: they still need the capability to get into the world and observe it firsthand, close-up.) Any kind of "correctness," even being a self-proclaimed "contrarian," impedes openness. In research, we have enough of people who see things as most everyone does; we desperately need ones prepared to step back and see the obvious as no-one else has. "Dare to be naïve," said Buckminster Fuller (1975:xix) .
Theory development is really about discovering patterns [let's make this point #17], recognizing similarities in things that appear dissimilar to others, i.e., making unexpected connections. Theory is about connections, and the more, and the more interesting, the better.
In my first study, my doctoral research, I found that managers got interrupted a lot. That their work was largely oral. That they spent a lot of time in lateral relationships.
I just wrote it down. All this had to be patently obvious to anyone who ever spent time in a managerial office, behind the desk or in front of it. (It is our great discredit that too few scholars of "management" ever did, or do.) These findings just didn't jive with the then (and largely still) prevalent view of managerial work, dating back to Henri Fayol's book of 1916: "planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling." (Four words for controlling.) Where are the lateral relations here? What room does this leave for interruption? Sure managers control (this is our flat earth theory), but they do much that is evidentially quite different. I just wrote it down, and so managed to parlay some rather obvious observations about the emperor (not being naked so much as attired in a different suit) into an academic reputation. Lucky me. Not so difficult. Nobody ever said: MBAs. It is 462 pages long, and every part of it was redone at least five times. One very long chapter, which was eventually spit into five chapters (3-6), was redone at least nine times. I just kept coming back until it felt right.
But not here. It feels right to keep this messy, like theory development itself, so as better to make my points. The first of a thousand articles, the rest never to be written. 
